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Abstract:	  	  
Transnational governance initiatives increasingly face the problem of regime complexity in 
which a proliferation of regulatory schemes operate in the same policy domain, supported by 
varying combinations of public and private actors.  The literature suggests that such regime 
complexity can lead to forum-shopping and other self-interested strategies which undermine the 
effectiveness of transnational regulation.  Based on the design principles of experimentalist 
governance, this paper identifies a variety of pathways and mechanisms which promote 
productive interactions in regime complexes.  We use the case of the EU’s Forest Law 
Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative, interacting with private certification 
schemes and public legal timber regulations, including those of third countries such as the US 
and China, to demonstrate how an increasingly comprehensive transnational regime can be 
assembled by linking together distinct components of a regime complex. We argue that it is the 
experimentalist features of this initiative and its regulatory interactions, which accommodate 
local diversity and foster recursive learning from decentralized implementation experience, that 
make it possible to build up a flexible and adaptive transnational governance regime from an 
assemblage of interconnected pieces, even in situations where interests diverge and no hegemon 
can impose its own will.	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Forthcoming in Regulation and Governance (2012) 
 
I.	  Introduction	  
It is a commonplace of international relations theory that effective, integrated regulatory 
regimes cannot easily be constructed in issue-areas characterized by divergent interests and 
beliefs among key actors, where there is no hegemon with the power to impose a single set of 
rules (Keohane & Victor 2011; Hasenclever et al. 2000).  The result in such conditions is 
typically regime complexity: a proliferation of regulatory schemes operating in the same policy 
domain, supported by varying combinations of public and private actors, including states, 
international organizations, businesses, and NGOs.  Where these parallel, overlapping, or 
competing initiatives are not joined up into a coherent hierarchical system, the ensuing 
fragmentation has often been held to undermine the effectiveness of transnational regulation 
(Raustiala & Victor 2004; Alter & Meunier 2009).  Recently, however, some scholars working in 
this area have identified the possibility of productive interactions emerging or being deliberately 
orchestrated among the components of such transnational regime complexes (Keohane & Victor 
2011; Abbott & Snidal 2009b, 2010; Alter & Meunier 2009).  This special issue is itself a 
reflection of such rethinking, as the editorial introduction proposes a new conceptual framework 
for analyzing both positive and negative interactions between transnational business governance 
initiatives operating in the same economic sector or policy domain as the product of “a dynamic 
co-regulatory process involving actors with different stakes and competencies…who perform 
different regulatory functions” (Eberlein et al., this issue). 
In this paper, we build on such rethinking to outline a theoretically informed route to the 
stepwise construction of a joined-up transnational governance regime in hotly contested policy 
fields where no single actor can enforce a unilateral solution. We use the case of the European 
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Union’s Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative, interacting with 
private certification schemes and public legal timber regulations, including those of third 
countries such as the US and China, to illustrate how an increasingly comprehensive 
transnational regime can be assembled de facto if not de jure by linking together distinct 
components of a regime complex. We highlight the experimentalist features of the FLEGT 
initiative and its regulatory interactions, arguing that it is precisely these features, which 
accommodate local diversity and promote recursive learning from decentralized implementation 
experience, that make it possible to build up a flexible and adaptive transnational governance 
regime from an assemblage of interconnected pieces. 
II.	  Complexity	  and	  Experimentalism	  in	  Transnational	  Regime	  Formation	  
A.	  REGIME	  COMPLEXITY	  
Regime complexity may be defined as a situation in which there is no single, unified 
body of hierarchically imposed rules governing a transnational issue-area or policy domain, but 
instead a set of parallel or overlapping regulatory institutions. In a recent survey, Alter and 
Meunier (2009) sketch out the possible consequences of such plural institutional arrangements 
for transnational governance. Like most previous commentators, they argue that regime 
complexity increases the likelihood of “cross-institutional political strategies”, such as forum 
shopping, regime shifting, and strategic inconsistency. Faced with competing institutions and 
rules, actors will exploit regulatory diversity to pursue self-interested goals and particularistic 
advantages.  In forum shopping, actors strategically select from among a set of institutional 
venues in hopes of obtaining a decision that will advance their own specific interests.  In regime 
shifting, they try to move the regulatory agenda for a particular issue from one institution to 
another in order to reshape the global set of rules.  In strategic inconsistency, actors intentionally 
create a contradictory rule or exploit contradictions between overlapping institutions in order to 
weaken the effect of existing disadvantageous rules.  Alter and Meunier argue that regime 
complexity creates greater structural opportunities for these cross-institutional strategies and 
suggest further research to evaluate their frequency and impact. 
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Although Alter and Meunier (2009) focus primarily on the negative consequences of 
regime complexity, they also suggest that it may generate more positive interactions between 
parallel or overlapping institutions. Thus competition between regimes can promote productive 
experimentation by actors pursuing different approaches, reduce the risk of failure of any single 
institution, stimulate cross-fertilization and horizontal learning, and enhance accountability by 
creating new opportunities for dissatisfied parties to challenge existing rules.  But Alter and 
Meunier do not specify under what conditions such competition can produce these positive 
effects, nor do they identify institutional strategies for promoting them. 
Keohane and Victor (2011) elaborate further on the potential for regime complexity to 
generate positive interactions in transnational governance. In their view, “loosely coupled” 
regime complexes, or sets of interlinked institutions without an overall architecture, often emerge 
as a creative response to the failure of attempts to create a more comprehensive and integrated 
international regime. Where the interests and beliefs of key actors persistently diverge and there 
is no hegemonic power, a weak or non-existent international regime is the most likely result.  
Under these conditions, groups of actors may create narrower institutions in order to move parts 
of the regulatory field forward.  These uncoordinated moves may actually produce a stronger de 
facto regulatory regime.  For instance, regime fragmentation increases the probability that 
individual components of complex problems such as climate change can be tackled separately 
and solutions adapted to local or regional conditions and concerns.  In this way, if the first-best 
world of a coherent, broadly agreed global regulatory regime proves politically unfeasible, there 
may be a second-best world in which a loosely coupled regime complex improves regulatory 
outcomes in comparison with the real alternative of a weak or non-existent overarching regime.   
In a more radical departure from standard regime theory, Keohane and Victor go on to 
argue that such loosely coupled regime complexes may also be more flexible across issues and 
adaptable over time than a hierarchical system of rules imposed by a monopolistic international 
institution. Rather than representing a second-best alternative to a broadly agreed global 
regulatory regime, regime complexes may thus offer a superior starting point for building a 
joined-up, sustainable set of transnational governance institutions.  Keohane and Victor set out a 
number of criteria for evaluating actually existing regime complexes in terms of their coherence, 
accountability, determinacy, sustainability, epistemic quality, and fairness.  But they do not 
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provide a road map for the emergence of regime complexes with these beneficial features, nor do 
they identify a governance architecture within them for learning from local experimentation. 
Recent work on transnational private, public-private, and multi-stakeholder regulation 
reaches similar conclusions.  Thus Abbott and Snidal (2009a, 2009b) observe that the 
proliferation of Regulatory Standard Setting (RSS) schemes in fields like labor rights, human 
rights, and the environment can undermine the effectiveness of transnational governance by 
raising compliance costs for firms, creating opportunities for both firms and states to shop 
around for the weakest or most favorable standards, and confusing consumers and other public 
audiences.  But they also argue that the multiplicity of competing RSS schemes has a number of 
salient virtues in comparison to “International Old Governance” (hierarchical regimes led by 
intergovernmental organizations or IGOs): facilitating adaptation of standards and procedures to 
local circumstances; promoting regulatory experimentation; and avoiding institutional capture, 
by obliging RSS schemes to compete with one another for legitimacy and public support (Abbott 
& Snidal 2009b).  To retain the benefits of multiplicity within “Transnational New Governance” 
while minimizing the disadvantages of complexity, Abbott and Snidal recommend that states and 
IGOs should “orchestrate” RSSs by establishing substantive and procedural criteria for approved 
schemes, and publicizing the results to consumers and other audiences; providing material 
benefits to firms meeting the standards of approved schemes such as relaxed administrative 
requirements or preferential access to loans, grants, and contracts; and fostering collaboration 
and comparison among competing schemes to identify, diffuse, and scale-up effective practices 
and approaches (Abbott & Snidal 2009b; 2010).  Like Keohane and Victor, however, Abbott and 
Snidal do not delineate a governance architecture within which local experimentation and 
dispersed expertise can be systematically combined with coordinated learning and regime 
coherence. 
B.	  EXPERIMENTALISM	  
Experimentalism, we argue, provides just such a governance architecture.  Defined in the 
most general terms, experimentalist governance is a recursive process of provisional goal-setting 
and revision based on learning from comparison of alternative approaches to their advancement 
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in different contexts.  Experimentalist governance in its most developed form involves a multi-
level architecture, whose four elements are linked in an iterative cycle.  First, broad framework 
goals (such as “sustainable forests” or “legally harvested timber”) and metrics for gauging their 
achievement are provisionally established by some combination of “central” and “local” units, in 
consultation with relevant stakeholders.  Second, local units are given broad discretion to pursue 
these goals in their own way.  These “local” units can be public, private, or hybrid partnerships.  
In regulatory systems, they will typically be private firms and the territorial authorities or branch 
organizations to which they immediately respond.  But, third, as a condition of this autonomy, 
these units must report regularly on their performance and participate in a peer review in which 
their results are compared with those of others employing different means to the same ends.  
Where they are not making good progress against the agreed indicators, the local units are 
expected to show that they are taking appropriate corrective measures, informed by the 
experience of their peers.  Fourth and finally, the goals, metrics, and decision-making procedures 
themselves are periodically revised by a widening circle of actors in response to the problems 
and possibilities revealed by the review process, and the cycle repeats (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012).  
These four key elements should be understood as a set of necessary functions which can 
be performed through a variety of possible institutional arrangements. There is in such an 
experimentalist architecture no one-to-one mapping of governance functions to specific 
institutional mechanisms or policy instruments, and vice versa.  A single function, such as 
monitoring and review of implementation experience, can be performed through a variety of 
institutional devices, operating singly or in combination.  Conversely, a single institutional 
mechanism, such as a formal peer review, can perform a number of distinct governance 
functions, such as assessing the comparative effectiveness of different implementation 
approaches, holding local units accountable for their relative performance, identifying areas 
where new forms of national or transnational capacity building are required, and contributing to 
the redefinition of common policy objectives (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008). 
Experimentalist governance architectures of this type have become pervasively 
institutionalized across the European Union, covering a broad array of policy domains from 
regulation of energy, telecommunications, financial services, and competition through food and 
drug safety, data privacy, and environmental protection, to justice, security, and anti-
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discrimination rights  (Sabel and Zeitlin 2008, 2010).  But experimentalist governance 
architectures with similar properties can also be widely found in the United States and other 
developed democracies, both in the regulation of public health and safety risks, such as nuclear 
power, food processing, and environmental pollution, and in the provision of public services like 
education and child welfare (Sabel and Simon forthcoming).  Transnational experimentalist 
regimes likewise appear to be emerging across a number of major issue-areas, such as disability 
rights, data privacy, food safety, and environmental sustainability (Sabel and Zeitlin 2011). 
Experimentalist governance architectures have a number of salient virtues.  First, they 
accommodate diversity in adapting general goals to varied local contexts, rather than imposing 
uniform, one-size-fits all solutions.  Second, they provide a mechanism for coordinated learning 
from local experimentation through disciplined comparison of different approaches to advancing 
broad common goals. Third, both the goals themselves and the means for achieving them are 
explicitly conceived as provisional and subject to revision in the light of experience, so that 
problems identified in one phase of implementation can be corrected in the next.  For each of 
these reasons, such governance architectures have emerged as a widespread response to 
turbulent, polyarchic environments, where strategic uncertainty means that effective solutions to 
problems can only be determined in the course of pursuing them, while a multi-polar distribution 
of power means that no single actor can impose her own preferred solution without taking into 
account the views of others.   
The scope conditions for experimentalist governance are thus precisely the opposite of 
those for regime formation in standard international relations theory.  For the latter, as we have 
seen, the formation of a comprehensive international regime depends on a convergence of 
interests and beliefs among the key actors, or the capacity of a hegemonic power to impose her 
preferred rules.  Experimentalist governance, by contrast, depends on strategic uncertainty, a 
situation in which actors do not know their precise goals or how best to achieve them ex ante but 
must discover both in the course of problem-solving, as well as on a polyarchic or multi-polar 
distribution of power, where no single actor can enforce a unilateral solution.  Thus under 
conditions of polyarchy and disagreement among the parties, where standard international 
relations theory sees bleak prospects for creating a unified, effective multilateral regime, 
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experimentalism discerns instead the possibility of building a new type of transnational regime 
with a different governance architecture.  Because of their reflexive, self-revising capacity and 
deliberately corrigible design, such experimentalist governance architectures are also well-
adapted to cope with volatile, rapidly changing environments characterized by deep uncertainty, 
which prominent theorists like Young (2006: ch. 7) and Keohane and Victor (2011) consider the 
critical contemporary challenge to sustaining effective international regimes. 
C.	  EMERGENT	  PATHWAYS	  AND	  CAUSAL	  MECHANISMS 
Experimentalist governance appears particularly well-suited to transnational domains, 
where there is no overarching sovereign with authority to set common goals, and where the 
diversity of local conditions and practices makes adoption and enforcement of uniform fixed 
rules even less feasible than in domestic settings. Yet the very polyarchy and diversity that make 
experimentalist governance attractive under such conditions can also make it difficult to get a 
transnational experimentalist regime off the ground.  Thus, too many participants with sharply 
different perspectives may make it hard to reach an initial agreement on common framework 
goals.  Conversely, a single powerful player may be able to veto other proposed solutions even if 
he cannot impose his own.   
In some cases, an experimentalist regime may nonetheless be created through the 
established multilateral procedures for negotiating international agreements, as a result of 
reflexive learning by state and non-state actors from the failures of more conventional 
approaches. The clearest example is the 2008 UN Convention on the Rights of Disabled Persons.  
Traditional regimes of this kind contain catalogues of specific obligations for states and sporadic 
international monitoring, understood as an analogue and (ideally) precursor to judicial 
enforcement. The CRDP, as de Búrca (2010) documents, arose out of a sustained debate among 
participating governments and NGOs about the deficiencies of such international human rights 
treaties.  It departs from the model of formalist law strictly enforced by a court by incorporating 
many experimentalist features, including broad, open-ended goals such as “reasonable 
accommodation” for the disabled; participation of national NGOs and human rights institutions 
in implementation monitoring; and annual review of its operations on the basis of comparative 
national data by an inclusive conference of stakeholders.   
	  
 
10	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  OSGOODE	  CLPE	  RESEARCH	  PAPER	  SERIES	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [VOL.	  07	  NO.05]	  
Conversely, a transnational experimentalist governance architecture may also emerge 
through “cooperative decentralization” of an established international regime in response to 
failed attempts at imposing uniform universally applicable standards.  Something of this kind 
may be occurring in the field of financial regulation, where pervasive differences in national and 
regional circumstances have led in the past to “sham compliance” with tightly harmonized global 
rules.  Thus the new Financial Stability Board, as Helleiner and Pagliari (2011) argue, appears to 
be moving fitfully towards “the development and promotion of broad principles-based regulatory 
standards”. These would allow for a substantial margin of policy autonomy to accommodate 
regional and national diversity, supported by “activities such as information-sharing, research 
collaboration, early warning systems, and capacity building.” Compliance with these broad 
regulatory standards would then be secured through a combination of regular peer reviews, 
periodic assessments by international financial institutions, and restriction of market access for 
non-conforming jurisdictions.  
Often, however, the familiar coordination and collective action problems discussed 
earlier will block the initial formation of a comprehensive multilateral experimentalist regime.  
But that is only the beginning, not the end of the story.  Because they are defined in functional 
rather than structural terms, experimentalist governance architectures can take a variety of 
institutional forms.  They can be built in multiple settings at different territorial scales, which can 
be nested within one another vertically and joined up horizontally.  A number of emergent 
pathways and causal mechanisms can be identified through which transnational experimentalist 
regimes may be assembled piece by piece in this way, rather than being constructed as a unified 
whole through conventional multilateral procedures.  These pathways should be understood 
analytically as stylized, ideal-typical trajectories leading from a characteristic starting point 
(national or international, public or private) towards the emergence of a transnational 
experimentalist regime, while the mechanisms should be understood as recurrent causal 
processes that explain the movement along these trajectories.i 
There is no reason to believe that these ideal-typical pathways and mechanisms exhaust 
the full range of possible routes to a transnational experimentalist regime, nor are they mutually 
exclusive, since they can often be found in combination with one another in specific empirical 
11	  	  	                                           ASSEMBLING AN EXPERIMENTALIST REGIME	  
cases.  Whether these pathways originate with public or private actors, or at the national or the 
international level, they converge on a multi-level, multi-actor governance architecture which in 
practice should efface the relevance of these distinctions and thus the relevance of particular 
starting points and development patterns.  In this sense, these experimentalist mechanisms can 
also be understood as devices for overcoming the path dependency and institutional inertia which 
many standard theorists consider endemic to transnational regimes, both public and private 
(Keohane & Victor 2011; Büthe & Mattli 2011).   
In our analysis of the emergence of a transnational experimentalist regime for sustainable 
forestry and the control of illegal logging, we will focus on four such ideal-typical pathways.  
The first involves the creation of private experimentalist regimes in response to impasses in 
multilateral negotiations and inaction by public authorities, followed by their diffusion vertically 
along supply chains and horizontally within industry associations.  In forestry, as we will see in 
the next section, a transnational coalition led by environmental NGOs established a private 
scheme to develop sustainable management standards and certify their application in response to 
the governance gap resulting from the failure of earlier intergovernmental efforts to agree to a 
binding global forestry convention.  The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), as we shall also see, 
has many experimentalist features, including not only its multi-stakeholder governance structure 
and deliberative decision-making procedures, but also its broad, principles-based standards, 
adapted to local conditions by national or regional chapters; continuous monitoring, independent 
verification, and revision of individual forest management plans; and full traceability of certified 
wood from initial harvest to final point of sale.   
One mechanism through which private forest certification has expanded and developed is 
vertical diffusion along supply chains from downstream customers to upstream producers.  Thus 
retailers, branded manufacturers, and government procurement agencies have responded to NGO 
campaigns for responsible sourcing by pressing and sometimes assisting their suppliers to 
upgrade standards and achieve sustainable forestry certification.  A second such mechanism is 
horizontal diffusion within industry associations.  In some cases, industry associations have 
accepted FSC standards and promoted certification among their members.  In others, they have 
established alternative business-dominated schemes with weaker initial standards and 
verification requirements.  Either way, industry associations have proved important institutional 
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devices for recruiting forestry firms into certification schemes, coordinating their responses to 
changing demands from external actors, and pooling learning from implementation experience.   
A second pathway towards a transnational experimentalist regime involves unilateral 
regulatory initiatives subject to procedural requirements imposed by multilateral institutions like 
the World Trade Organization (WTO).  Thus a large jurisdiction such as the EU or the US may 
unilaterally seek to extend its internal regulations to transnational supply chains as a condition of 
market access.  WTO rules permit member states to restrict imports in order to protect public 
health and the environment.  But as interpreted by the WTO Appellate Body in its landmark 
Shrimp-Turtle decisions (1998, 2001), they also require states wishing to restrict imports on 
these grounds to ensure that their proposed measures are non-discriminatory and proportional to 
the intended goals, take account of relevant international standards, and consult with their trading 
partners to minimize the impact on affected third parties (Weinstein & Charnovitz 2001; Scott 
2007). These disciplines, when they permit such extensions at all, can thus provide a reflexive 
mechanism for transforming unilateral regulatory initiatives by developed jurisdictions into a 
joint governance system with stakeholders from the developing world, if not a fully multilateral 
experimentalist regime. 
 The EU’s FLEGT initiative offers a clear illustration of this pathway.  As we will see in 
section IV, FLEGT seeks to control exports of illegally logged wood by negotiating Voluntary 
Partnership Agreements (VPAs) with developing countries to create export licensing systems, 
based on jointly defined legality standards, regular monitoring and performance review, and 
third-party verification.  Local civil society stakeholders participate both in the definition of 
“legally harvested wood” and in monitoring its certification, each of which are explicitly 
conceived as revisable in light of the other, while the EU provides development assistance to 
build up the regulatory capacity of both public and private actors.  But the effectiveness of this 
experimentalist initiative depends on individual developing countries’ willingness to sign such 
agreements.  To reinforce FLEGT’s effectiveness and extend its geographical scope, the EU has 
therefore enacted legislation requiring all businesses placing wood products on the European 
market from whatever source to demonstrate “due diligence” in ensuring that they had not been 
illegally harvested.  The EU’s approach to combating illegal logging appears likely to be 
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accepted as legitimate not only by the WTO but also by developing countries, because it offers 
them an opportunity to participate in a jointly governed system of legality assurance, while 
imposing parallel obligations on European timber firms to exercise due diligence in respecting 
local legal standards. 
A third pathway arises where multilateral treaty obligations do not impose procedural 
constraints on unilateral regulation, but there is transnational pressure for coordination of 
separate national and/or regional regimes. Under these circumstances, convergence towards an 
experimentalist regime can emerge via mutual influence, transmitted through thin links such as 
the operation of multinational corporations within each other’s territory, or interchange within 
transnational advocacy networks.  In forestry, as we will see in section V, the US has recently 
adopted legislation subjecting trade in illegally harvested wood to criminal prosecution, with 
harsher penalties for violators who fail to exercise “due care” in acquiring such products, and 
obligations for importers of timber products to declare their species and place of origin.  
Although the US Lacey Act lacks many of the experimentalist features of FLEGT and the EU 
Timber Regulation, civil society activists and public officials from both jurisdictions are 
exploring opportunities for synergy between the two regimes through exchange of information 
and experiences on the one hand, and joint pressure on their trading partners to adopt similar 
schemes on the other.  
A fourth pathway to the development of transnational experimentalist regimes works 
through benchmarking and public comparison of competing components of regime complexes.  
In private forest regulation, as we argue in section III below, both the governance arrangements 
and substantive standards of the FSC and its business-led rivals have converged as a result of 
what we call “benchmarking for equivalence”, conducted by retailers, government procurement 
agencies, and industry associations in response to pressure from NGOs, which has pushed the 
industry schemes to raise their standards and the FSC to make certification less costly and more 
practically feasible, even if they remain some distance apart on key issues.  Without such 
processes of public comparison, which obliged each “private” certification scheme to justify and 
where necessary revise its standards to meet the assessment of external actors, the competition 
between them could easily have degenerated into a race to the bottom, rather than upward 
harmonization through mutually productive interaction.  FLEGT VPAs and the EU Timber 
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Regulation extend and formalize this logic of accountability by providing for public recognition 
of private certification schemes, subject to comparative assessment of their legality standards, 
monitoring systems, and verification arrangements.  A weaker form of such public recognition is 
also implicit in the US Lacey Act, where participation in a bona fide private certification scheme 
may serve as mitigating evidence of “due care”.  Both the EU and the US, finally, are likely to 
have a similar impact on their major trading partners such as China by pressing them to adopt 
equivalent legality assurance regimes, whether public or private, as a condition of market access. 
Taken together, we conclude, these four pathways and the mechanisms underlying them 
appear to be leading to the de facto emergence of a joined-up transnational experimentalist 
regime for sustainable forestry and control of illegal logging, which blurs and may ultimately 
efface standard distinctions between public and private regulation. 
III. From Failed Public Governance to Private Experimentalism  
Transnational efforts to build a regulatory regime for forestry date back to 1992, when 
environmental groups and Northern countries concerned with high rates of tropical deforestation 
proposed a binding global convention at the UN Conference on Environment and Development. 
Developing countries led by Malaysia rejected that proposal, fearing that their capacity to 
achieve economic development would be constrained by northern demands for conservation, 
which they also viewed as a disguised form of protectionism (Bernstein & Cashore 2004).  The 
Rio Earth Summit instead produced only a set of non-binding forest management principles, 
which enshrined the principle of national sovereignty over forest exploitation. Over the ensuing 
30 years, several additional attempts, including the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF) 
and its successor, the Intergovermental Forum on Forests (IFF), created international dialogues 
on forest sustainability but as at Rio, “the IPF delegates failed to agree on major issues” 
(Rosendal 2001: 450; Humphreys 2006). 
 Efforts by some northern governments to tackle this issue by imposing unilateral 
environmental standards or mandatory eco-labeling systems for imported timber were likewise 
blocked by their incompatibility with the rules of the global trade regime.  Thus, for example, the 
Austrian government was obliged to withdraw a law banning import of unsustainably harvested 
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tropical wood products in the face of complaints by developing countries to the WTO’s 
predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  An earlier effort during the 
late 1980s to develop a system for certifying ecologically acceptable forest products through the 
International Tropical Timber Trade Organization (ITTO) similarly foundered on opposition 
from timber-exporting countries and charges of GATT-incompatibility (Bartley 2007). 
A. Experimenting with Private Certification 
Such failures of multilateral agreements and national public governance, however, can 
create openings through which non-state actors creatively move parts of a complex issue 
forward.  Forestry provides a clear illustration.  Thus in response to the failure of nations to agree 
on common global rules at the 1992 Rio conference, civil society groups began developing 
private standards and certification systems.  A year after the Rio debacle, environmental NGOs, 
businesses, foundations, and social organizations launched the Forest Stewardship Council.  The 
FSC has a number of experimentalist features which explicitly address the impasse at Rio by 
establishing a deliberative, multi-stakeholder process for setting and revising broad, principles-
based standards for sustainable forest management, adapting them to local conditions, certifying 
their voluntary application by firms, independently verifying the results, and requiring corrective 
action where needed. 
In order to overcome the mistrust and resentments that blocked agreement at Rio, the 
FSC creatively balanced the influence of environmental, business, and social organizations, as 
well as southern and northern interests, in its central standard setting and revision body.  
Standards and procedures are determined through deliberation and supermajority voting by three 
equal chambers representing environmental, economic, and social interests, with equal weight 
within them for members from the global north and the global south.  
The FSC’s principles include respect for labor and indigenous peoples’ rights, as well as 
biodiversity, ecological sustainability, and environmental management requirements. These 
general principles are elaborated through more specific global standards and criteria, which are 
in turn adapted to local conditions by national or regional chapters.  
Compliance with FSC principles and standards is verified by independently accredited 
third-party monitoring organizations.  Conformance audits occur every five years, supplemented 
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by annual surveillance audits. Audit teams review forest management planning documentation, 
firm financial data, and contracts for services (such as chemical applications) as well as conduct 
consultations with forest employees and other local stakeholders, such as NGOs, community 
leaders, resource managers, and neighbors about problems with the certified forest’s 
management.   
FSC audits also enable continuous learning at the forest management unit (FMU) level.  
Principle 8 states that certified management units must continually assess the condition of the 
forest, monitoring harvest yields, growth rates, compositional changes in flora and fauna, 
environmental and social impacts of harvesting, and costs, productivity and efficiency of forest 
management. Results of such monitoring must be incorporated into the revision of management 
plans.  In theory, therefore, the FSC establishes a process of continuous learning, whereby firms 
should be able to assess regularly updated information on environmental impacts, growth rates, 
yields, etc.  This also means that auditors have access to information about the relative 
effectiveness of forest management practices, which they could use to develop performance-
based comparisons across certified units. Such comparisons could be used to put additional 
pressure on laggards and leaders and to inform the regular three-year General Assembly Meeting 
of the FSC, where the chambers vote on any changes needed in the standards.  To date, however, 
the FSC has inadequately developed its own capacity for experimentalist “learning by 
monitoring” (Sabel 1994), even if the institutional preconditions for the functioning of such a 
system are already in place, because it fails to pool, compare and thereby induce greater 
reflection on learning. 
To promote accountability of both certified forests and monitors, the FSC requires 
accredited auditors to publish public summaries of the audit reports on their websites.  
Descriptions of the forest are recorded (location, management objectives, size of holding, types 
of sites) and documentation of the audit findings are provided, including major and minor non-
conformances, summaries of field and office assessments, and stakeholder interviews.  These 
audit summaries have enabled watchdog groups and activists to monitor the functioning of the 
FSC and thereby contribute to securing the FSC’s accountability to the broader forest 
governance community.  
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The FSC also certifies supply chains. In order for retail products to carry an FSC label, 
each step along the supply chain must be certified. Traditionally, chain of custody audits have 
been built on “paper-based” systems, where checkers evaluate whether companies have systems 
in place to track FSC certified wood through the supply chain. Recent advances however suggest 
that DNA fingerprinting technologies may soon enable genetically-based spot checks to 
supplement paper and system audits (Auld et al. 2010). 
The FSC thus displays several key features of an experimentalist governance architecture.  
Its global organization establishes broad framework goals for “sustainable forests.”  The national 
and regional chapters are given discretion to customize these goals to local conditions.  
Individual FMUs apply these standards and report regularly on their performance through audits.  
Theoretically, the FSC can orchestrate a process of information pooling and review in which the 
results of local experimentation with sustainable forestry are compared with those of others 
employing different means to the same ends. Auditors do in fact require that local units show 
that they are taking appropriate corrective measures, although the FSC could do more to require 
continuous improvement from experience-based learning across as well as within FMUs, by 
endogenizing lessons learned from implementing the standards in regular revisions at General 
Assembly meetings. 
B. Productive Interactions or Regime Fragmentation? 
The emergence of private certification schemes could have led to a highly fragmented 
regime in which high-standards forest operations joined the FSC for strategic advantage while 
others looked to weaker schemes to shield themselves from public regulation (Bartley 2007).  In 
fact, as competing industry certification schemes emerged, progressive firms and those under 
strong state regulatory standards did join the FSC for strategic advantage, while many large 
forest industry companies and small forest landowners joined weaker competing schemes, 
creating an apparently fragmented governance space (Cashore et al. 2004).  
However, three key mechanisms have combined to encourage more positive interactions 
between the FSC and its competitors (Overdevest 2004).  Rather than fragmentation, competition 
among private schemes instead resulted in mutual adjustment, learning from experience, and 
increased accountability of schemes to one another and to external audiences.  This 
accountability, initiated by downstream customers, government procurement offices, and NGOs 
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through “benchmarking for equivalence”, enhanced the social nature of their rationality, 
explaining how a reflexive competition emerged which yielded productive interactions rather 
than a race to the bottom. 
These regime dynamics thus call attention to how issue-areas characterized by strategic 
uncertainty and complex interdependence, in which actors like forest companies cannot achieve 
narrow self-interested goals because they depend on the approval of others (such as consumers, 
retailers, regulators), may generate conditions for a more other-regarding rationality to emerge. 
Rather than shielding participants from public scrutiny, private certification schemes thus 
subjected them to broader demands for mutual accountability. We argue in subsequent sections 
that as EU FLEGT and potentially the US Lacey Act start to recognize private forest certification 
schemes as evidence of legality and subject them to a measure of public oversight, further 
productive interactions and a more coherent transnational governance regime can be expected to 
emerge, cutting across conventional distinctions between public and private authority. 
One mechanism through which private forest certification has expanded and developed as 
an alternative to the weak international regime created by states following Rio is vertical 
diffusion along global supply chains from downstream customers to upstream producers.  
Retailers, branded manufacturers, and public procurement agencies have responded to NGO 
campaigns for sustainable sourcing by pressing and sometimes assisting their suppliers to 
upgrade standards and achieve forestry certification. Initially, such large end-of-chain retailers 
only adopted FSC-preference policies after being targeted by NGO campaigns. NGOs thus 
played an important role in pushing economic actors to discover a “self-interest” in adopting 
higher standards so that they could put an end to the forest campaigns. Over time, however, such 
standards have become more broadly institutionalized as good business practice. 
In addition to these commercial supply chains, government purchasing policies provided 
a major stimulus for the adoption and diffusion of private forest certification standards.  
Denmark, Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, the UK, Japan and New Zealand, all accept 
private certification as evidence of legality and/or sustainability in meeting green public 
procurement standards (Gulbrandsen 2011).  In combination, public and private supply chains 
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have thus proved an important conduit for partial and selective transnational forest regulation in 
the absence of a multilateral regime. 
A second mechanism through which private certification has expanded and developed as 
an alternative to the weak public international forestry regime is horizontal diffusion within 
industry associations. As of April 2011, for instance, the Program for the Endorsement of Forest 
Certification Schemes (PEFC), which historically has been much more closely associated with 
industry associations, had certified 60 percent more hectares than the FSC.ii   
The PEFC’s larger share of certified acreage reflects its emergence as the standard of 
choice among national forest industry associations, sometimes even becoming a requirement for 
associational membership, as with the US Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI).  The PEFC, like 
the FSC, endorses nationally customized certification systems. But it originally appealed to non-
industrial landowner associations who found the FSC’s model of regular annual audits 
economically impractical, because many small-scale forest operations do not harvest every year 
and because they worried that the FSC was dominated by environmental advocacy organizations 
which knew little about silviculture.  Small landowners’ associations in countries dominated by 
fragmented, small-scale ownership, but generally quite strong environmental regulations like 
Finland, Sweden, and Germany created the PEFC in order to combat pressure to join the FSC. 
Later however, the PEFC enrolled industrial landowner associations whose members harvest 
thousands of acres on an annual basis in countries such as the US and Canada, as well as 
industrial forestry associations in the global south, such as Argentina and Brazil (Cashore et al. 
2004).   
The high rate of adoption of private standards through associational channels suggests the 
comparative organizational advantage of horizontal diffusion strategies for private standards, 
although in forestry this has arguably benefitted industry-sponsored certification schemes more 
than their NGO-sponsored counterparts. A key mechanism engendering more productive 
interactions in the face of such forum shopping is public comparison and benchmarking for 
equivalence.  In the following discussion, we show how such benchmarking generated positive 
interactions and upward convergence of standards among private certification schemes. The 
results presented here suggest that a narrow, asocial strategic rationality leading to races to the 
bottom is not a necessary outcome of competition within regime complexes. 
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Impressed by the differences between the FSC and its competitors and concerned that 
these would not be readily apparent to others in the broader governance field, NGOs, retailers, 
government procurement agencies, and international organizations like the World Bank began to 
benchmark the standards of these schemes against one another. NGOs supporting the FSC took 
the lead in generating comparative studies in which operational details of different emerging 
schemes were exposed to public debate.  In each major location where competitors emerged 
NGOs produced detailed comparisons, showing how FSC and competitors differed in terms of 
substantive and procedural standards, emphasizing how the weaker rival schemes lacked the 
FSC’s balanced governance, annual and independent audits, stakeholder consultations, regular 
revisions, and performance-based principles and assessment criteria.  
 These reports generated unexpected reactions from weaker industry schemes, which 
became concerned that such contrasts would de-legitimate them with external audiences.  But 
this benchmarking process also generated learning by the FSC about the relative strength of 
competing systems, such as the PEFC’s greater accessibility and affordability for smaller 
landowners.  The NGOs did not intend their reports to guide internal changes in the standards, 
but hoped instead that external audiences would reject the FSC’s competitors.  But these 
comparisons instead ended up producing substantial adjustment on both sides. 
The explanation for this unexpected development can be found in the legitimacy 
dynamics of private governance schemes. Both Cashore et al. (2004) and Black (2008) argue that 
because private certification schemes do not enjoy the same taken-for-granted legitimacy of 
public authorities, they need to gain it from legitimacy-providing communities such as supply 
chain actors, industry associations, academics, international organizations, etc.  Their need to be 
accepted by such legitimacy communities gives the latter significant power to influence private 
certification standards in accordance with their own narrow rationality, a point emphasized Black 
and Cashore et al.  But it also creates interdependence and strategic uncertainty among the 
participants in these relationships. 
By strategically targeting public and private supply chains’ reliance on “demonstrably 
questionable” forest management or certification systems, NGOs not only rendered the 
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differences between the FSC and its competitors transparent, but also highlighted to downstream 
customers their deep dependence on the trustworthiness of upstream suppliers.  This exposed the 
interdependence and uncertainty in the system.  End-users’ reputations depended on how 
seriously suppliers took their standards.  Rather than reinforcing a narrow self-interested 
rationality, weaker certification schemes were forced to justify their standards publicly, at the 
same time as retailers, manufacturers, and government procurement agencies came under 
pressure to live up to their commitment to high standards.  These comparisons therefore had the 
effect of broadening the rationality of industry certification schemes vis-à-vis retailers and other 
end-users, as well of the latter vis-à-vis their own standards. 
The results of benchmarking for equivalence can be seen in the often dramatic responses 
by industry schemes.  The FSC and its competitors started off far apart in both substantive and 
procedural standards.  Thus the industry-sponsored schemes initially lacked multi-stakeholder 
governance structures, independent audits, stakeholder consultations, regular revisions and 
performance-based principles and assessment criteria (Overdevest 2005, 2010).  Table 1, adapted 
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Conversely, the FSC in turn has modified its own standards in certain areas to make certification 
less costly and more practically feasible, for example by introducing simplified procedures and 
group certification schemes for small forest operations.   
Other studies of competing forest certification schemes, while acknowledging this trend 
towards cross-scheme convergence, also emphasize continuing divergences in substantive 
standards not only between the FSC and its competitors, but also among the national and 
regional standards of the FSC itself.  But these studies tend to assume that more stringent and 
prescriptive substantive standards, e.g. regarding riparian logging exclusion zones or clear-
cutting bans, are inherently superior, without reference to their practical effectiveness in 
promoting environmental sustainability in specific local contexts, which would be the key 
evaluation criterion from an experimentalist perspective.  Conversely, such studies also tend to 
consider any adaptation of FSC standards to forest firm concerns as a sign of weakening in 
conformity to market pressures, irrespective of whether changes, such as reducing the frequency 
of audits of small landowners or introducing a secondary “percentage-in/percentage-out” label 
for certified wood, may enhance rather than compromise their fitness for purpose (Cashore et al 
2004; McDermott et al. 2009). 
Responses to recent comparisons suggest that these dynamics remain effective in the 
sense that the gaps between the PEFC and FSC continue to close.  Thus a recent World Wildlife 
Fund (WWF) study concludes that the 2010 revision of the PEFC international standard brings it 
“much closer” to the International Social and Environmental Accrediting and Labeling (ISEAL) 
Alliance code of good practice, endorsed by the FSC, which sets minimum criteria for a credible 
voluntary standard system, including stakeholder consultation, balanced participation, and 
adaptation to local conditions (Walter 2011). 
These comparisons however are largely based on analyses of the paper standards.  As 
such, they lack the capacity to generate disciplined assessments of how well the schemes are 
working on the ground, which could feed into public accountability, recursive learning, and 
external pressure for improvement.  This is a crucial issue and the next generation of evaluations 
of competing forest certification schemes—and thus their future interactions—would be better 
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served if they were based on performance rather than paper-based comparisons.  Such 
comparisons are necessary both to keep the FSC and its competitors responsive to their own 
standards as well to forestall growing gaps between them.   
Over the past two decades, private forest certification has offered a creative but 
incomplete response to the failed multilateral forest regime by extending vertically down supply 
chains and horizontally across industry associations. Over 25 percent of managed forest lands 
worldwide have been enrolled in one of the competing forest certification schemes. But the 
global south’s share of certified acreage has been far smaller, as most developing country 
producers could not afford the associated costs, needed external support to adopt high forest 
sustainability standards, and faced little domestic demand for certified forest products.iii  
Furthermore, through benchmarking for equivalence the standards of the weaker industry 
schemes’ standards have been raised, although inadequate attention has been paid to 
comparisons of on-the-ground performance. Yet despite these mechanisms of vertical, 
horizontal, and competitive diffusion, private experiments with forest certification have not so 
far produced a coherent, joined-up transnational governance regime. 
IV. FLEGT as an Experimentalist Transnational Regimeiv 
By the early 2000s, private certification schemes had thus achieved high rates of 
coverage among industrial forest companies in developed economies.  But their take-up by 
developing countries remained limited, especially in the tropical forests whose deterioration 
sparked the original campaign for global regulation. In response, NGOs, governments, and 
international organizations have focused increasingly on combating illegal logging, an endemic 
problem in many countries, which depresses prices for legally harvested wood and undercuts the 
adoption of sustainable forestry practices (Humphreys 2006: ch. 7; Cashore et al. 2007; Lawson 
& MacFaul 2010). 
The most ambitious such initiative is the EU’s FLEGT Action Plan, adopted in 2003, and 
buttressed by the enactment of a voluntary import licensing scheme in 2005 and the EU Timber 
Regulation in 2010.  Like private certification itself, FLEGT arose from dissatisfaction with the 
lack of progress in tackling the problem of forest degradation through multilateral institutions.  
During the mid-1990s, environmental NGOs had successfully pushed the issue of illegal logging 
onto the agenda of the UN Intergovernmental Panel (later Forum) on Forests, which called on 
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participating countries to consider national action and promote international cooperation to 
reduce illegal trade in forest products.  The G8 then included illegal logging in its 1998 Action 
Programme on Forests, and proposed a set of measures to improve domestic forest law 
enforcement and reduce illegal international trade in forest products, which were echoed in turn 
by the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002.  Beginning in 2001, 
the World Bank sponsored a series of regional dialogues on Forest Law Enforcement and 
Governance (FLEG), which brought together governments, businesses, and NGOs from timber-
producing and consuming countries to discuss domestic and international actions aimed at 
tackling illegal logging and trade.  These initiatives, particularly the FLEG processes in Asia and 
Africa, produced a growing political and epistemic consensus on the problem of illegal logging 
and appropriate policies to combat it, including improvements in domestic law enforcement and 
forest management capacity, involvement of stakeholders and local communities in forest 
decision-making, monitoring of forest resources, and coordinated efforts to control international 
trade in illegally harvested timber.  They also stimulated bilateral agreements by producing 
countries with consuming countries, international donors, and NGOs to implement some of the 
proposed measures.  But none of these processes generated binding commitments among the 
participating countries, nor the creation of systematic mechanisms for monitoring progress 
towards their agreed aims (European Commission 2003; Humphreys 2006: ch. 7; Cashore & 
Stone 2011). 
Under these circumstances, the EU decided to proceed unilaterally, by linking the 
improvement of forest law enforcement and governance (FLEG) to regulation of trade (T), but in 
ways shaped by the need to comply with WTO rules, as well as to obtain the consent of 
developing countries themselves.  The centerpiece of the FLEGT Action Plan was the 
negotiation of bilateral Voluntary Partnership Agreements with developing countries to establish 
licensing systems for the export of legally harvested wood to the European market, where 
legality includes reference to the social and environmental conditions of production.  Because 
they are voluntary and jointly agreed, such licensing systems were expected to be fully WTO-
compatible, unlike the unilateral eco-labeling requirements for imported tropical wood proposed 
by some northern governments a decade earlier (Brack 2009).  But the VPAs were also designed 
25	  	  	                                           ASSEMBLING AN EXPERIMENTALIST REGIME	  
to win the active cooperation of developing country stakeholders by promoting “equitable and 
just solutions” for all concerned interests, engaging local communities and NGOs in forest sector 
governance reform, and providing capacity-building support for civil society and the private 
sector as well as for public fiscal, law enforcement, and forestry authorities.  Given the 
“important but not dominant” place of the EU in the world market for wood products, the 
FLEGT Action Plan underlined the need for continuing efforts to build an effective multilateral 
framework for controlling illegal trade in collaboration with other major importers.  But “in the 
absence of multilateral progress”, the European Commission would eventually consider further 
measures, including “legislation to control imports of illegally harvested timber into the EU” 
(European Commission 2003). 
The first FLEGT VPA was signed with Ghana in September 2008, followed by the 
Republic of Congo (2009), Cameroon (2010), the Central African Republic (2010), Indonesia 
(2011), and Liberia (2011).  Negotiations are currently underway with Malaysia, Gabon, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, and Vietnam.  These agreements have taken years to negotiate, 
not only because of the technical complexity and political sensitivity of the issues concerned, but 
also because the EU has insisted on an open and deliberative multi-stakeholder process, with full 
participation of domestic civil society in their design and implementation.  To facilitate this 
process, the EU has provided extensive support to partner country governments, civil society 
organizations, and indigenous forest communities through capacity-building projects organized 
by international NGOs and consultancies.   
At the heart of each VPA is a national Legality Assurance System (LAS), based on 
jointly agreed definitions of legally harvested timber; a legality “grid” or “matrix”, with 
indicators and verifiers defined for each obligation; and a comprehensive, integrated system for 
controlling the flow of logs from the forest to the point of export, ensuring that no illegal wood 
enters the supply chain.  Wood conforming to these standards will receive FLEGT export 
licenses, subject to verification of individual shipments, and monitoring of the operation of the 
LAS as a whole by independent auditors and civil society organizations, as well as by 
government officials.  Each VPA is overseen by a joint committee comprising both EU and 
partner country representatives, which is responsible for resolving disputes; monitoring and 
reviewing implementation of the agreement; assessing its broader social, economic, and 
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environmental impacts; and recommending any necessary changes, including further capacity-
building measures. The European Commission and EU member states commit to providing 
financial and organizational support for implementation of the agreement, and to helping partner 
countries raise additional funding from other international sources as needed. 
FLEGT VPAs are designed to incorporate key experimentalist features such as 
deliberation, revisability, and recursive learning.  Thus the legality standards in each agreement 
are the product of a deliberative, multi-stakeholder review process, requiring reconciliation and 
consolidation of conflicting regulations from different sources, including international treaty 
commitments as well as domestic law.  They cover not only fiscal, forestry, and environmental 
regulation, but also labor law, worker health and safety, and the rights of indigenous 
communities.  In many of these areas, the review process revealed significant inconsistencies and 
gaps in existing regulation, which the signatory governments have committed themselves to 
rectify through legal and administrative reforms.  The legality definitions themselves are 
explicitly subject to periodic review and revision in light of new developments and experience 
with their implementation.  
Verification and monitoring, similarly, are conceived as mechanisms for learning and 
continuous improvement of forest management and governance, as well as compliance 
enforcement. Thus for example, the role of independent  monitoring is understood as “not just to 
find infractions as they occur, but to investigate the root causes of the infraction by analyzing 
information channeled from various sources in a systematic manner and to document governance 
problems” (DG DEVCO 2011: 28; Resource Extraction Monitoring 2010).  Transparency and 
public disclosure of information on verification of the LAS are likewise regarded as crucial 
provisions aimed at enabling civil society networks to participate actively in monitoring its 
operations at all levels.  The joint implementation committees, which operate by consensus but 
may refer unresolved disputes to arbitration, are constituted as deliberative problem-solving 
bodies responsible for sustaining the agreement through improvements based on learning by 
monitoring of its implementation. 
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Although FLEGT VPAs are becoming increasingly standardized, they differ from one 
another in several areas, reflecting both specificities of the local setting, and the sequence in 
which they were negotiated.  Thus for example the Republic of Congo is creating two separate 
legality grids, one for forest timber and the other for commercial plantations, while Cameroon, 
which is a major processor of imported wood, has led the way in developing a sophisticated 
traceability and chain-of-custody system to prevent illegal timber from neighboring countries 
entering its supply chain. Although the LAS in each VPA applies to all timber exports, not just 
those to the EU, countries vary in how they are integrating production for the domestic market 
into these systems in order to avoid creating a double standard of legality. Institutional 
arrangements for participation of civil society actors in implementing and monitoring the VPAs 
likewise vary cross-nationally, becoming progressively more extensive and specific in later 
agreements.  Negotiating FLEGT VPAs has thus been a “learning-by-doing process”, with 
transfer of knowledge and experience not only between countries, but also across regions (e.g. 
between Cameroon and Vietnam, which is a major processor of imported timber from the 
Mekong Basin).  This adaptive learning and knowledge transfer process has been supported by 
the development of a rich and variegated expert community of research and policy institutions, 
consultancies, and NGOs. 
FLEGT VPAs were attractive from the start to some developing countries because of 
their potential to enhance consumer confidence, improve access to European markets, increase 
tax revenues, and open up new sources of development assistance.  But these agreements are also 
quite challenging, both politically and administratively, in terms of their demands for multi-
stakeholder participation and reform of forest-sector governance.  The first round of VPA 
negotiations accordingly proceeded slowly, with some developing country governments 
remaining initially reluctant to move beyond exploratory talks, particularly as their competitors 
continued to be able to export timber to the EU with no legality checks.   
In response to these concerns, the EU enacted new legislation in 2010 requiring all 
businesses placing timber products on the European market from whatever source to demonstrate 
“due diligence” in ensuring that they had not been illegally harvested. Such due diligence can be 
demonstrated in three possible ways: (1) possession of a FLEGT VPA export license; (2) 
establishment of a private risk management system, with full traceability, risk assessment, and 
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risk mitigation procedures; or (3) participation in a recognized monitoring scheme, based on 
independent verification of compliance with applicable forestry legislation.  The European 
Commission, in cooperation with national “competent authorities”, is responsible for 
determining that recognized monitoring bodies are maintaining effective systems of due 
diligence against illegal logging, including procedures for remediation of violations.  EU 
member states are responsible for setting and enforcing penalties on companies contravening the 
regulation, but the Commission will orchestrate a dialogue network among the national 
competent authorities to ensure that implementation does not vary too widely. The Commission 
will produce regular progress reports on the operation of these rules based on information 
provided by the member states, and the regulation itself will be reviewed, and if necessary 
revised, at the end of five years. 
Like FLEGT, the EU Timber Regulation (EUTR) is carefully designed to comply with 
WTO rules, because it applies the same requirements to domestic operators placing wood 
products on the European market as to importers.  By making FLEGT export licenses a “green 
lane” into the European market, the new regulation significantly increases the incentive for 
developing countries to sign VPAs.  For processing countries and export businesses, the cost per 
unit of legality verification and traceability is likely to be substantially lower under a national 
VPA scheme compared to importing licensed wood from another FLEGT country or certifying 
its legality independently (Gooch 2010; Proforest 2010).  For each of these reasons, the number 
of VPA negotiations successfully concluded or nearing completion has spiked sharply since the 
legislation’s passage. 
Together, FLEGT and the EUTR are also likely to have a significant positive impact on 
private forest certification.  Most FLEGT VPAs explicitly envisage recognition of private 
certification schemes in their export licensing system, provided that these incorporate the agreed 
legality definitions, and subject to regular monitoring and review of their operation and 
procedures.  The due diligence requirement of the EUTR will likewise stimulate forestry firms 
and importers from non-VPA countries to join private certification schemes as a cost-effective 
alternative to creating and administering their own free-standing risk management systems. A 
number of private certification bodies, including the FSC, have already announced plans to 
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develop legality assurance standards designed to meet EU requirements (Proforest 2010; 
presentations and discussion at Chatham House and Potomac Illegal Logging Fora, January 10-
11 and May 4, 2011).  
It is possible, of course, that FLEGT and the EUTR could have a negative impact on 
private certification schemes by spurring both customers and suppliers to shift their energies 
towards meeting less demanding legality requirements (Bartley 2011; Cashore & Stone 2011). 
But by reducing a major source of cost pressure on legitimate timber operations, these measures 
appear likely instead to encourage progression to more ambitious standards of sustainable 
forestry promoted by private certification schemes like the FSC.  The FSC itself is developing a 
modular, step-wise system in which forest management units would first be certified for legality 
by accredited auditors, while committing to work towards certification to full sustainability 
standards at a subsequent stage (Guillery 2011).  In the UK, a leader in green procurement 
policies, FLEGT licenses will be acceptable for public purchases until 2015, when sustainable 
timber will be required (Brack and Buckrell 2011).  Finally, by harmonizing inconsistencies, 
filling gaps, and resolving conflicts in domestic law, including those concerning customary rights 
of indigenous communities, the revised legality standards produced through the VPA process 
will greatly facilitate auditing of compliance by individual FMUs with national legal 
requirements, which is a core element of all private certification schemes (Proforest, 2010). 
By placing private forest certification schemes under ongoing scrutiny and review by 
national and European authorities, FLEGT and the EUTR should push them to ensure that illegal 
logging is actually detected and corrected on the ground, thereby addressing a key gap in their 
public accountability.  Depending on how they are implemented, the procedures for recognizing 
monitoring organizations and reviewing their operations under the EUTR may also serve as a 
mechanism for improving the performance standards of private certification schemes through 
public comparison and benchmarking for equivalence.  The implementing regulations are still 
being worked out, but are likely to include clear procedures for avoiding conflicts of interest and 
internal control systems for certification and verification equivalent to those used by other bodies 
providing these services in comparable sectors (European Forest Institute 2011a.) 
FLEGT and the EUTR go a long way towards the construction of a transnational 
experimentalist regime for forest sector governance.  They demonstrate how such a regime can 
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emerge from unilateral regulatory initiatives by large developed country jurisdictions, subject to 
procedural constraints imposed by the rules of multilateral institutions like the WTO.  The EU’s 
approach to combating illegal logging appears likely to be accepted as legitimate not only by the 
WTO but also by developing countries, because it offers them an opportunity to participate in a 
jointly governed system of legality assurance, while imposing parallel obligations on European 
timber firms to exercise due diligence in respecting local legal standards.  FLEGT VPAs and the 
inclusive, deliberative negotiation processes leading up to them have already had a major impact 
in a number of countries in terms of empowering civil society stakeholders, exposing 
inconsistencies and gaps in existing forest regulation, securing political commitments to legal 
and governance reform, and measurably reducing illegal logging in anticipation of their 
implementation (Lawson & Brock 2010). The joint governance systems created to oversee these 
agreements institutionalize key experimentalist principles, including regular review and revision 
of both the underlying legality standards and the assurance system designed to achieve them 
through recursive learning by monitoring of implementation experience.  The EUTR enhances 
the incentives for developing country governments to sign VPAs and ensures that wood imports 
into the European market will not be diverted to countries with weaker legality enforcement 
standards.  Its due diligence requirements are already encouraging importing firms to join private 
forest certification schemes, while promising to enhance the public accountability and 
performance standards of these schemes by subjecting them to comparative review and 
benchmarking for equivalence. 
As the original FLEGT Action Plan observed in 2003, the EU is an important but not 
dominant player in the world wood market.  According to an analysis conducted for the OECD, 
the EU accounted in 2005 for 49% of all industrial wood imports, followed by the US at 23%, 
China at 8%, and Japan at 7%.  But the EU accounted for only 24% of imports from countries 
representing a high risk of illegal logging, compared to 23% for China and 14% for both the US 
and Japan respectively (Contreras-Hermosilla et al.  2007).  Since then, Chinese imports and 
exports of wood products have both surged dramatically (European Forest Institute 2011b).  
Hence the global effectiveness of the EU regime for promoting sustainable forestry and 
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combating illegal logging will inevitably depend on its capacity to develop productive 
interactions with regulatory initiatives in other large importing countries. 
V.	  Joining	  Up	  the	  Pieces:	  Transnational	  Governance	  Interactionsv	  
Beyond FLEGT and the EUTR, the most important recent development in the 
transnational campaign against illegal logging has been the 2008 extension of the US Lacey Act 
from fish and wildlife to plants.  This amended Act, which dates back originally to 1900, makes 
it a criminal offense to import, trade, or otherwise handle any timber product harvested in 
violation of the laws applicable in the country of origin.  Penalties, which can include 
imprisonment, fines, and confiscation of goods, depend on the level of intent of the violator, and 
the extent to which “due care” was exercised to avoid foreseeable risks of trafficking in illegal 
products.  To facilitate detection of illegal timber, importers are obliged to submit customs 
declarations with information on the scientific name of the species, the value and quantity of the 
shipment, and the country of origin. 
The amended Lacey Act, which was the product of a “Baptist-bootlegger” coalition of 
environmental NGOs and domestic forest firms concerned about competition from illegal wood 
imports (Cashore & Stone 2011), lacks most of the experimentalist features of FLEGT and the 
EUTR.  It takes foreign laws as they stand, without seeking to reconcile ambiguous and 
contradictory legislation or fill gaps in existing regulations, unlike the updated legality standards 
produced by FLEGT VPAs.  Nor does it engage local forest communities and other domestic 
stakeholders in the definition of illegal logging, controversies over which have derailed previous 
US efforts to address this problem in bilateral trade agreements (Brack & Bucknell 2011: 7). US 
officials, prosecutors, and judges are thus placed in the difficult position of assessing the current 
state of foreign laws in order to determine whether a given timber shipment has been harvested 
illegally.  Lacey Act enforcement relies primarily on spot inspections by US Customs and Fish & 
Wildlife agents, often based on tipoffs from external competitors or internal whistleblowers.  
Such inspections and the prosecutions to which they give rise are highly resource-intensive, and 
hence necessarily infrequent. The US Department of Agriculture’s Animal and Plant Health 
Inspection Service (APHIS) is seeking a major increase in staff and funding to identify 
suspicious shipments by analyzing declarations of origin for imported wood, which are now 
coming in at a rate of 5000-6000 per week, but it is unclear whether this will be forthcoming in 
the current fiscal and political climate.   
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Given these limits of enforcement capacity, the major impact of the amended Lacey Act 
is likely to come through the deterrent effect of high-profile prosecutions, which despite their 
low frequency appear to create strong incentives for larger firms to set up internal legality 
assurance systems to mitigate the risk of criminal liability and reputational damage.  The Act is 
also likely to stimulate importing firms to enroll in private certification systems as a means of 
demonstrating “due care” in avoiding illegally logged wood, though unlike the EUTR it neither 
refers explicitly to third-party monitoring schemes nor provides for public accreditation and 
oversight of their operations.  The SFI has revised its rules to incorporate the requirements of the 
Lacey Act, and there has been a significant rise in demand for private certification and legality 
verification services among US firms since its passage in 2008. 
Despite these transatlantic differences in governance architecture, there are significant 
mutual influences and points of intersection between the US and EU regimes for combating 
illegal logging.  Thus the EU FLEGT Action Plan encouraged US environmental activists to 
push for the Lacey Act amendment, while the latter helped to build political momentum for the 
passage of the EU Timber Regulation, and inspired the European Parliament to incorporate an 
“underlying offense” of handling illegal timber which was absent from the Commission’s 
original proposal (British Woodworking Federation 2010).  Conversely, the revised legality 
standards and export licenses produced by FLEGT VPAs will dramatically simplify the task of 
US Lacey Act enforcement for imported timber from those countries.  EU authorities’ 
monitoring and review of firms’ internal risk management systems and private third-party 
certification schemes could likewise be used as an information platform for improving the 
effectiveness of the more conventional US enforcement system and adjudicating due care claims 
in US courts.  Dense networks of private activists, public officials, and business people from 
both jurisdictions meet regularly in illegal logging fora on both sides of the Atlantic to exchange 
experiences and ideas about how best to exploit opportunities for productive interaction between 
the US and EU regimes. 
But the most powerful synergy between the two regimes is their combined impact on 
other countries.  The US and the EU together account for a majority of the global wood market, 
which is now formally closed to illegally harvested timber.  The Lacey Act amendment has 
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helped to overcome resistance to FLEGT VPAs and stimulate the negotiation of domestic 
legality assurance systems in countries like Indonesia, where these had previously stalled.  The 
co-existence of Lacey and the EUTR ensures that illegal wood exports from non-VPA countries 
are not simply diverted from one large northern market to another.  Their joint example has 
stepped up moral and political pressure on other developed economies to adopt similar measures, 
notably Australia, which has announced plans for new legislation against illegal timber imports.  
The EU cites the Lacey Act in its information missions in Latin America and Asia, while the US 
is pushing for the inclusion of measures against illegal logging in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
trade pact which it hopes to conclude with the other members of the Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC).vi 
Crucial to the effectiveness of any transnational regime to combat illegal logging and 
promote sustainable forestry is the incorporation of China, which has emerged as the world’s 
largest importer of timber from high-risk countries, as well as a leading global exporter of 
processed wood products such as furniture, flooring, plywood, and paper (European Forest 
Institute 2011b). China now officially increasingly accepts the need for national and international 
action to combat illegal logging, and has signed bilateral cooperation agreements or memoranda 
of understanding on FLEG with a number of countries, including the US, the EU, Australia, 
Indonesia, Russia, and Myanmar.  Few tangible steps have thus far been taken to implement 
these agreements, beyond a crackdown on unlicensed wood imports from Myanmar and the 
issuance of non-binding guidelines for Chinese forest firms abroad.  But both the national 
authorities and forest firms themselves appear to recognize the strategic importance of 
sustainability certification and legality verification in safeguarding access for Chinese wood 
exports to Western markets.  Thus the Chinese authorities are currently designing a national 
legality verification scheme aimed at complying with EUTR and Lacey Act requirements, while 
at the same time aggressively seeking to promote their own sustainability and chain-of-custody 
certification system at the expense of the FSC, which had begun to achieve a toehold among 
domestic forest firms over the past decade.  The take-up of these schemes and their impact on the 
behavior of Chinese wood products firms, which often have little internal capacity to monitor 
and control their supply chains, will depend in no small measure on the rigor with which the US 
and the EU enforce their due diligence/due care requirements.  Critical in this regard will be the 
EU’s approach to recognizing the Chinese national legality verification and certification scheme 
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(European Forest Institute 2011b; Bartley 2011; van der Wilk 2010).  Such benchmarking for 
equivalence of local certification and verification schemes will be equally important for 
integrating other large producing countries like Russia and Brazil, which are unlikely to sign 
FLEGT VPAs, into the emergent transnational forestry regime.vii 
VI.	  Conclusion	  
Since 1992, national governments have failed to produce a binding global forest 
convention. Instead, beset by divergent interests and values, governments have created a weak 
international public regime that has failed to produce meaningful change on the ground. In 
response to this impasse, private actors have sought to push the forest governance agenda 
forward piecemeal. The FSC sidestepped the primary barriers to a global forest convention by 
balancing the voice of the main stakeholders and taking the discussion outside the deadlocked 
intergovernmental arena. Addressing the voice gap between north and south, bypassing 
entrenched government actors, and pursuing regulation voluntarily along supply chains and 
through industry associations, this strategy elicited competing responses from other actors. The 
FSC was quickly followed by industry imitators with weaker standards, which were broadly 
adopted and threatened to undermine the nascent experiment in multi-stakeholder forest 
certification. However, through public comparison and benchmarking for equivalence, the 
competition between private schemes resulted in mutual adjustment and upward convergence of 
standards, without completely closing the gap between them.  But the most serious limitation 
was the sluggish uptake of certification in the global south, due to the more difficult conditions 
faced by developing country producers.  
Faced with this lacuna, the EU moved unilaterally to advance a different but 
complementary approach to transnational forest governance. Inspired by an emerging global 
consensus on the role of illegal logging in tropical deforestation and disciplined by WTO 
procedural constraints on import restrictions, the EU launched the FLEGT Action Plan.  At its 
heart is a participatory process requiring developing countries to reach consensus on the 
definition and prevention of illegal logging among domestic stakeholders, combined with 
external support for the construction and monitoring of export licensing legality assurance 
systems.  Encouraged by the EU initiative, American environmental activists successfully joined 
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with domestic forest firms in persuading the US government to amend the Lacey Act, thereby 
reinforcing political momentum for passage of the EU Timber Regulation.  Despite their 
architectural differences, the EU and US regimes together close off the world’s largest markets 
to illegally logged wood, build an ongoing platform for transnational exchange of information 
and implementation experience, and provide a powerful stimulus to participation in forest 
certification and legality verification schemes by private firms and third-country governments. 
Although there is still no global forestry convention, the interaction between these pieces 
seems to be generating an effective patchwork or joined-up regime, whose core elements have 
experimentalist characteristics.  In particular, by combining local experimentation with 
performance monitoring, information pooling, and deliberative review of successes and failures, 
there is increased capacity for coordinated learning from pieces of the regime complex.  The rise 
of private forest certification demonstrated the importance of experimentalist disciplines of 
participatory goal-setting and comparative performance monitoring, while its own failures 
pointed to the need to address capacity gaps between north and south to advance a transnational 
forestry regime complex. FLEGT provided an important pathway for addressing these capacity 
issues, but also created a platform for learning from comparison of overlapping negotiations in 
different settings.  The VPAs in turn quickly demonstrated both their transformative potential 
and their limited capacity for autonomous diffusion, which the EUTR and the Lacey Act, as well 
as the possibility of similar legislation in other countries, go a long way toward redressing.  
Compared to the weak public international regime built since 1992, this emergent regime 
complex, which involves a multiplicity of regulatory experiments, monitoring, and revision 
based on implementation experiences, appears as though it will produce a more comprehensive, 
strongly recursive policy effort than its individual pieces or stand-alone public or private efforts.  
Although implementation of many components of this emergent forest governance regime is still 
at an early stage, there is evidence that it has already begun to have a significant and measurable 
impact on the ground, especially in reducing illegal logging.viii 
Four major conclusions for transnational regime formation follow from this analysis.  
First, the paper shows that there are multiple pathways to the creation of an experimentalist 
transnational regime, which can be combined in various ways in specific empirical cases.  These 
pathways have different starting points (public/private, national/international), involve different 
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causal mechanisms, and operate at different levels (within and between separate regulatory 
schemes).  But they lead in a common direction: towards the construction of transnational 
governance regimes with a similar experimentalist architecture, which can be nested within one 
another vertically and joined up horizontally.  Table 2 presents in analytical form the four main 
pathways and associated causal mechanisms through which an experimentalist transnational 
governance regime has developed in the forest sector over the past two decades.  Although the 
interactions between them analyzed in this paper are specific to the forestry case, these ideal-
typical pathways and mechanisms—and others like them—are general enough to be applicable 
across many other sectors of transnational governance (cf. Sabel and Zeitlin 2011). 
Table 2: Pathways and Mechanisms of Experimentalist Regime Formation in the Forest Sector 
Pathway Mechanism(s) Case(s) 
From multilateral impasse & 
public inaction to private 
transnational regime formation  
• Balanced, multi-
stakeholder governance	  
• Vertical diffusion along 
supply chains	  





From unilateral public 
(national/regional) regulatory 
initiatives to transnational 
joint governance  
• Multilateral procedural 
requirements as 
reflexive disciplines	  
• EU FLEGT	  
Convergence between separate 
national/regional regimes	  
• Mutual influence through 
transnational networks	  
• Exchange of information 
& experiences	  
• Reciprocal support 
towards third countries	  
 
• Interactions between EU 
FLEGT/Timber 
Regulation & US Lacey 
Act	  
Joining up competing pieces 
of regime complexes 
• Public comparison & 
benchmarking for 
equivalence	  
• Upwards convergence 
between FSC & PEFC	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  Second, this paper challenges the view that building an effective transnational regime is 
possible only under restrictive scope conditions, notably the existence of a hegemonic power or 
broad convergence of interests, values, and beliefs among the parties.  The forest governance 
case is widely discussed precisely because it is beset with interest and value conflicts and the 
absence of a hegemon. This paper demonstrates how polyarchy, diversity, and strategic 
uncertainty can be used productively to promote the formation of a transnational regime based on 
coordinated learning from decentralized experimentation.  Insofar as there has been a partial 
convergence of policy preferences and beliefs among key actors in the forest sector, which 
includes developing as well as developed countries, this should be considered as an 
endogenous product of the experimentalist mechanisms we analyze in the paper, notably 
reflexive learning from past failures of both public and private regulation, multilateral procedural 
constraints on unilateral initiatives, and benchmarking for equivalence of competing schemes, 
rather than an exogenous precondition for the construction of an effective transnational 
regime. Polyarchy, diversity, and strategic uncertainty characterize many issue-areas in global 
governance today, suggesting the wide applicability of experimentalist approaches to 
transnational regime formation.   
Third, experimentalism provides an analytical framework for evaluating transnational 
governance interactions in regime complexes.  In our view, experimentalism provides a 
normatively desirable governance architecture for building regimes that respect diversity, 
address complexity, and respond to change. The four architectural elements of (1) broad 
participatory goal-setting, 2) decentralized experimentation with alternative implementation 
approaches, (3) performance monitoring, information pooling, and peer review, and (4) revision 
of goals, metrics, and procedures based on deliberative comparison of experience, identify a set 
of governance functions that can be provided through a variety of institutional forms by different 
combinations of public and private actors.  The keys to evaluating the effectiveness of such 
regime complexes lie in whether progress is made towards achieving the desired performance 
goals, and whether failures and the inevitable unintended consequences of specific institutional 
designs are recursively recognized and redressed.   
Looking forward, we argue that a key mechanism for realizing the promise of the 
emergent transnational regime is the experimentalist discipline of benchmarking and public 
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comparison of its components. Benchmarking for equivalence is an important accountability 
mechanism for polyarchic governance arrangements. Because polyarchic systems, by definition, 
lack a central authority with the legitimacy to impose its will, the process of publicly comparing 
nascent experiments constitutes a crucial platform for deliberation and reflexivity.  
Benchmarking leads to public reflection on successes and failures that creates mutual 
accountability by obliging actors in the regime to provide persuasive accounts of their 
performance.  Regularly accounting for performance is a central requirement of fully developed 
experimentalist regimes.  To support such accountability, experimentalist regimes must be both 
performance-based and participatory. In forestry, the nascent transnational regime has been 
characterized by policy experiments that lead to performance assessment, learning from success 
and failure, and broad stakeholder participation.  Introducing more systematic benchmarking 
both within each component of the regime complex (forest certification schemes, VPAs, legality 
assurance systems, timber regulations) and between them could thus help to institutionalize a 
platform from which to continue productive adaptation and elaboration of the emerging 
experimentalist governance architecture. 
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